Ministers Engage in Favoritism Too

Philine Widmer and Noémie Zurlinden

Journal of Public Economics, 2022, vol. 213, issue C

Abstract: To study favoritism by cabinet members in 36 African countries, we hand-collect birthplace information for all cabinet members (2001–2015). Focusing on health outcomes, we provide causal evidence of favoritism by health ministers and, less so, key ministers. Neonates’ and infants’ mortality is lower when the current health minister originates from their region, especially for children of vulnerable (rural-based or uneducated) mothers. Co-regional health ministers also increase healthcare access at birth, particularly for vulnerable mothers. Thus, healthcare access likely explains part of the mortality-lowering effects. We find evidence for ethnic motives playing a role in favoritism but not (short-run) electoral motives.

Keywords: Infant mortality; Child health; Favoritism; Political capture; Patronage; Corruption; Africa; Georeferenced data; Spatial analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 I10 I18 J13 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:213:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722001098

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104707

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