How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment

Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, Emma Manifold, Konstantinos Matakos and Dimitrios Xefteris

Journal of Public Economics, 2022, vol. 215, issue C

Abstract: We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. Our key contribution comes from bringing the candidate supply of redistribution policies into an equilibrium analysis with voter demand for redistribution. It yields an important new insight: the extent of minority group political representation among the electoral candidates critically affects redistribution outcomes.

Keywords: Identity; Inequality; Redistribution; Minority Representation; Representative Democracy; Voting Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D72 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722001499

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104747

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