Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games

Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro Vicente and Inês Vilela

Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 218, issue C

Abstract: Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game.

Keywords: Corruption; Game; Trust; Lab-in-the-field; Citizen; Political leader; Incentives; Behavior; Elite capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C93 D10 D70 D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games (2021)
Working Paper: Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:218:y:2023:i:c:s0047272722002018

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104799

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