Competence-loyalty tradeoff under dominant minority rule: The case of Manchu rule, 1650-1911

Shuo Chen, Xinyu Fan, L. Colin Xu and Xun Yan

Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 220, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines how a million Manchus, as a dominant minority, partly relied on a cross-ethnic personnel strategy to rule over 100 million Han Chinese for 267 years. Under this strategy, Han elites were appointed to handle daily administrative issues, on top of whom Manchu superiors were assigned for oversight. We find that more frequent local extreme weather – a proxy for governance complexity – led to higher likelihood of such cross-ethnic arrangements. This link is stronger in regions where Han elites accumulated more discretionary power. Moreover, the cross-ethnic strategy was associated with better local economic development, more efficient policy execution, and enhanced recognition of imperial authority.

Keywords: Dominant minority; Indirect governance; Loyalty; Economic history; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N45 P16 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:220:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000257

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104843

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