De Jure versus De Facto transparency: Corruption in local public office in India

Dahyeon Jeong, Ajay Shenoy and Laura V. Zimmermann

Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 221, issue C

Abstract: Governments and NGOs have invested heavily in fighting corruption by designing anti-poverty programs that maximize transparency and accountability. We analyze whether corruption is still widespread in the context of one such program, a massive make-work scheme in India where every job spell is posted publicly online. Linking millions of administrative job records to local election outcomes, we measure how many jobs local politicians self-deal. In the year after the election, winners of close elections receive 3 times as many workdays as losers and typical villagers. We find that corruption persists because of a gap between de jure and de facto transparency. Only when citizens have tools to access information in a timely manner does corruption eventually vanish.

Keywords: corruption; Self-dealing; Transparency; Local politicians; Anti-poverty programs; Greasing the wheels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H53 H75 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:221:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723000373

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104855

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