Where does opportunity knock? On doors that voted for the executive

Cameron A. Shelton

Journal of Public Economics, 2023, vol. 225, issue C

Abstract: The Trump Tax Bill of 2017 gave U.S. state governors a one-time opportunity to select an exogenously fixed number of census tracts for preferential tax treatment. We model a governors’ choice of tracts to maximize competing goals of mobilizing voters, rewarding co-partisan legislators, and alleviating poverty. We estimate the likelihood that an eligible tract is selected as a function of both the economic characteristics of the tract and the political characteristics of the governor and the relevant state and federal legislators. Our results show that the executive accountability engendered by eligibility for reelection is weakened by the dual constituency hypothesis.

Keywords: Opportunity zones; Dual constituency hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:225:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723001433

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104961

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