No-claim refunds and healthcare use
Daniel Avdic (),
Simon Decker,
Martin Karlsson and
Martin Salm
Journal of Public Economics, 2024, vol. 230, issue C
Abstract:
No-claim refunds are cost-control instruments which stipulate a payback agreement contingent on one or more claim-free years. We study how such no-claim refunds affect claiming behavior using claims data from a large German health insurer and a policy that increased the refund size for certain plans. We propose a method to decompose the effect on claims into behavioral and non-behavioral components, and show that individuals responded to the refund policy by reducing claims by eight percent on average. The effect persisted for several years; behavioral responses were stronger for clients with more to gain from the policy; and reductions in claims were not restricted to treatments of questionable medical value.
Keywords: No-claim refund; Moral hazard; Health insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G22 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:230:y:2024:i:c:s0047272723002438
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105061
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