Learning the hard way: Conflicts, sanctions and military aid

Edoardo Grillo and Antonio Nicolò

Journal of Public Economics, 2025, vol. 242, issue C

Abstract: Countries involved in conflicts learn about their military strength from the battlefield. We study how a third party intervenes to manipulate this learning. An attacker and a defender engage in a conflict whose outcome conveys information about the attacker’s strength. A third party worries that the attacker becomes more confident about its military strength and can intervene to help the defender. This intervention is risky: if the attacker wins despite the help the defender receives, its confidence increases even further. We show that optimal third-party intervention is non-monotonic in the attacker’s strength. We also show that a high level of patriotism and resolve to defend itself improve the defender’s odds in the conflict by inducing third-party intervention.

Keywords: Conflict; Sanctions; Military aid; Information design; Third-party intervention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:242:y:2025:i:c:s0047272725000088

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105310

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