Nothing for something: Marketing cancer drugs to physicians increases prescribing without improving mortality

Colleen Carey, Michael Daly and Jing Li

Journal of Public Economics, 2025, vol. 242, issue C

Abstract: Physicians commonly receive marketing-related transfers from drug firms. We examine the impact of these relationships on the prescribing of physician-administered cancer drugs in Medicare. We find that prescribing of the associated drug increases 4% in the twelve months after a payment is received, with the increase beginning sharply in the month of payment and fading out within a year. A marketing payment also leads physicians to begin treating cancer patients with lower predicted mortality. While payments result in greater expenditure on cancer drugs, there are no associated improvements in patient mortality.

Keywords: Analysis of health care markets; Information and product quality; Search; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I11 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:242:y:2025:i:c:s004727272500009x

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105311

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