Present bias in politics and self-committing treaties

Bård Harstad and Anke Kessler

Journal of Public Economics, 2025, vol. 246, issue C

Abstract: We study how international environmental agreements can take advantage of domestic time-inconsistency problems. Policymakers often prefer future policies to be sustainable, but are tempted to invest less when being in office. We find the equilibrium number of signatory countries to be higher than when preferences are time consistent, especially when the political environment is unstable and polarized and the international spillovers are limited. This model also explains participation in treaties whose mandates do not vary with the coalition size and why the coalition will not unravel if, for example, the US exits the Paris Agreement.

Keywords: International treaties; Time inconsistency; Self-commitment; Environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H87 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Related works:
Working Paper: Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties (2025)
Working Paper: Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties (2024)
Working Paper: Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:246:y:2025:i:c:s0047272725000702

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105372

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