A simple scheme to improve the efficiency of referenda

Alessandra Casella and Andrew Gelman

Journal of Public Economics, 2008, vol. 92, issue 10-11, 2240-2261

Abstract: Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to intense preferences: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus a single additional bonus vote to cast as desired. Decisions are then taken according to the majority of votes cast. We study the scheme in a number of different models and identify empirically plausible conditions under which ex ante utility increases, relative to simple majority voting.

Keywords: Referendum; Voting; Majority; voting; Large; elections; Storable; votes; Direct; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005)
Working Paper: A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005)
Working Paper: A Simple Scheme to Improve the Efficiency of Referenda (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:10-11:p:2240-2261

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