Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets

Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup

Journal of Public Economics, 2008, vol. 92, issue 5-6, 1531-1539

Abstract: This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets (2008)
Working Paper: Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:5-6:p:1531-1539

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