Separability and public finance

Stephane Gauthier and Guy Laroque

Journal of Public Economics, 2009, vol. 93, issue 11-12, 1168-1174

Abstract: In a second best environment, the optimal policy choice sometimes follows first best rules. This paper presents a formal general argument which allows to unify much of the literature. It lays down the information structure and separability assumptions under which the results hold in a variety of setups, with extensions to preference heterogeneity and individual production sets.

Keywords: Separability; Second; best; optimality; Indirect; taxes; Samuelson; rule; Pigovian; taxation; Individual; production (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Separability and public finance (2009)
Working Paper: Separability and Public Finance (2008)
Working Paper: Separability and public finance (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:11-12:p:1168-1174

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