Taxing education in Ramsey's tradition

Wolfram Richter

Journal of Public Economics, 2009, vol. 93, issue 11-12, 1254-1260

Abstract: Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey's Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour. Furthermore, if the earnings function displays constant elasticity, the choice of education should not be distorted. With the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity.

Keywords: Endogenous choice of education; labour; and saving Second-best efficient taxation Linear instruments Finite periods Ramsey's Rule Power Law of Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047-2727(09)00113-3
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Taxing Education in Ramsey's Tradition (2009)
Working Paper: Taxing Education in Ramsey's Tradition (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:11-12:p:1254-1260

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().