Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

Joel Slemrod and John Wilson

Journal of Public Economics, 2009, vol. 93, issue 11-12, 1261-1270

Abstract: We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become tax havens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs.

Keywords: Tax; competition; Tax; havens; Compliance; costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (151)

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Working Paper: Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:11-12:p:1261-1270

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