Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result

Jose Alcalde and Matthias Dahm

Journal of Public Economics, 2010, vol. 94, issue 1-2, 1-7

Abstract: We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties. The main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort. We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs. In this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds. Our results imply a partial robustness result for the all-pay auction.

Keywords: (Non-)deterministic; contest; All-pay; auction; Contest; success; functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (103)

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