Strategic delegation and voting rules

Bard Harstad

Journal of Public Economics, 2010, vol. 94, issue 1-2, 102-113

Abstract: The selection of political representatives depends on the political system. Principals, such as voters or districts, may benefit by strategically electing representatives different from themselves. While a status-quo biased delegate may be a better negotiator, an enthusiastic representative has a better chance of being included in the majority coalition. A larger majority requirement leads to "conservative" delegation and hence a status quo bias; a poor minority protection does the opposite. Through strategic delegation, the political system also determines whether centralization or decentralization is beneficial.

Keywords: Strategic; delegation; Elections; Collective; decisions; Voting; rules; Political; systems; Decentralization; v; centralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (42)

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Working Paper: Strategic Delegation and Voting Rules (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:1-2:p:102-113

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