The taxation of life annuities under adverse selection

Alexis Direr

Journal of Public Economics, 2010, vol. 94, issue 1-2, 50-58

Abstract: This paper studies how annuities should be taxed in a Mirrlees-type model in the presence of adverse selection and a positive link between income and longevity. The government is able to address the adverse selection problem by implementing a progressive marginal tax rate on annuities. This amounts to subsidizing small annuities (purchased by low incomes) and taxing large annuities (purchased by high incomes). Numerical simulations suggest that the taxation is significant and becomes more pronounced as annuitants get older.

Keywords: Optimal; taxation; Asymmetric; information; Life; cycle; models; and; saving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:1-2:p:50-58

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