Genetic adverse selection: Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease
Emily Oster,
Ira Shoulson,
Kimberly Quaid and
E. Ray Dorsey
Journal of Public Economics, 2010, vol. 94, issue 11-12, 1041-1050
Abstract:
Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. This finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for HD to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the HD-risk population with and without the HD mutation.
Keywords: Adverse; selection; Long-term; care; insurance; Huntington; disease; Genetic; testing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)
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Working Paper: Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance and Huntington Disease (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:11-12:p:1041-1050
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