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Interest group politics in a federation

Sergei Guriev, Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Journal of Public Economics, 2010, vol. 94, issue 9-10, 730-748

Abstract: The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996-2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.

Keywords: Federalism; Interest; groups; Inter-jurisdictional; externalities; Inter-state; trade; barriers; Multinational; firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Interest Group Politics in a Federation (2010)
Working Paper: Interest Group Politics in a Federation (2010)
Working Paper: Interest Group Politics in a Federation (2008) Downloads
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