Are we taxing ourselves?: How deliberation and experience shape voting on taxes
Rupert Sausgruber and
Jean-Robert Tyran ()
Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 1-2, 164-176
We let consumers vote on tax regimes in experimental markets. We test if taxes on sellers are more popular than taxes on consumers, i.e. on voters themselves, even if taxes on sellers are inefficiently high. Taxes on sellers are more popular if voters underestimate the extent of tax-shifting in the market. We show that inexperienced voters are prone to such a tax-shifting bias, that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism, but that pre-vote deliberation about tax regimes makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct. Our results suggest that voting on taxes is prone to bias and that easy-to-interpret facts are needed to de-bias voters.
Keywords: Tax-shifting; Tax; liability; side; equivalence; Learning; Deliberation; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Are We Taxing Ourselves? How Deliberation and Experience Shape Voting on Taxes (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:1-2:p:164-176
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba
More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().