EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions

Amrita Dhillon () and Iamele Rigolini

Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 1, 79-87

Abstract: We examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase. Firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism, reputation, the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in “connectedness;” or with a formal mechanism, legal enforcement, the effectiveness of which can be reduced by means of bribes. We show that formal and informal enforcement mechanisms do not necessarily substitute each other: while high levels of judicial efficiency decrease consumers' incentives to connect, higher consumers' connectedness leads to higher levels of judicial efficiency. We then look at how the equilibrium institutional mix evolves with the level of development. In doing so we show the presence of a new, physical, channel that can affect institutions—i.e. the frequency of bad productivity shocks that, in less developed settings, can impact on firms' incentives to cheat.

Keywords: Contracts; Institutions; Quality; Markets; Corruption; Reputation; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D8 L1 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272710001301
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Journal Article: Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Development and the Interaction of Enforcement Institutions (2006) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:1:p:79-87

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.09.013

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba

More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:1:p:79-87