Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 7-8, 639-645

Abstract: If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and Warr neutrality in the case of matching.

Keywords: Aggregative; games; Matching; mechanisms; Public; goods; Warr; neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Journal Article: Interior matching equilibria in a public good economy: An aggregative game approach (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7-8:p:639-645

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