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Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes

Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran and Kenju Kamei

Journal of Public Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 9-10, 1213-1222

Abstract: The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.

Keywords: Public; good; Voluntary; contribution; Formal; sanction; Experiment; Penalty; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (136)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:9-10:p:1213-1222

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