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Growing state–federal conflicts in environmental policy: The role of market-based regulation

Roberton Williams

Journal of Public Economics, 2012, vol. 96, issue 11, 1092-1099

Abstract: In recent years, cases in which state governments chose to override federal environmental regulation with tighter regulations of their own have become increasingly common, even for pollutants that have substantial spillovers across states. This paper argues that this change arose at least in part because of a shift in the type of regulation used at the federal level, from command-and-control regulation toward more incentive-based regulation. Under an incentive-based federal regulation, a state imposing a tighter regulation will bear only part of the additional cost, and thus has more incentive to tighten regulation than it does under federal command-and-control. This difference helps to explain observed patterns of regulation. In addition, it has implications for the choice of regulatory instruments. For a pollutant that causes both local and spillover damage, a federal pollution tax is likely to yield a more efficient outcome than federal command-and-control policy or a federal system of tradable permits.

Keywords: Environmental regulation; Federalism; Pollution taxes; Tradable permits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H23 H77 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Related works:
Chapter: Growing State-Federal Conflicts in Environmental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation (2010)
Working Paper: Growing State-Federal Conflicts in Environmental Policy: The Role of Market-Based Regulation (2010) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:11:p:1092-1099

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.08.003

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