 Subsidizing firm entry in open economiesMichael Pflüger and Jens Suedekum Journal of Public Economics, 2013, vol. 97, issue C, 258-271 Abstract: We develop a two-country model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms where entrants pay a sunk cost and randomly draw their productivity level. Governments collect lump-sum taxes and subsidize these sunk entry costs for the domestic entrepreneurs. One motive for this policy, valid already in autarky, is to tighten market selection. This selection effect leads to better firms that produce and sell more output at lower prices. In the open economy there is another, strategic motive for entry subsidies as the tightening of market selection leads to a competitive advantage for domestic producers in international trade. Our analysis shows that entry subsidies in the Nash equilibrium are first increasing, then decreasing in the level of trade freeness. Comparing the non-cooperative and the cooperative policies, we furthermore show that there is first too much and then too little entry subsidization in the course of trade integration. Keywords: Entry regulation; Entry subsidies; International subsidy competition; Welfare; Heterogeneous firms (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:97:y:2013:i:c:p:258-271 DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.07.002 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Public Economics is currently edited by R. Boadway and J. Poterba More articles in Journal of Public Economics from Elsevier |
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