How does corporate control affect the appointment, auditing expertise and reputation of independent directors? Evidence from Taiwan
Yung-Chuan Lee () and
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2017, vol. 64, issue C, 130-140
This study examines the influence of corporate control on the appointment and quality characteristics of independent directors. Our findings, based upon a dataset of related appointments within listed companies in Taiwan, suggest that the preferences of firms to voluntarily appoint independent directors has a positive association with the control right of the controlling shareholder, stemming from the cash flow rights, not from the deviation between ownership and control after decomposing the control. Most importantly, we find that the firms with high control right and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders are likely to voluntarily appoint independent directors with good auditing expertise and reputation.
Keywords: Appointment of independent directors; Auditing expertise of independent directors; Reputation of independent directors; Controlling shareholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:64:y:2017:i:c:p:130-140
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance is currently edited by R. J. Arnould and J. E. Finnerty
More articles in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().