EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Who benefits from insider regulation?

Florian Hauser and Klaus Schredelseker

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2018, vol. 68, issue C, 203-210

Abstract: The scope of insider trading regulation in financial markets is to enhance fairness by reducing information asymmetry. Even if this comes at the price of lower informational efficiency, it is regarded to increase the attractiveness of the market by protecting low-informed investors. Using agent-based modeling, we show that this argument does not hold. Our results indicate that very well informed traders profit the most from prohibiting informed insider trading, while low-informed traders hardly experience any benefit at all or may even be worse off than without inside regulation.

Keywords: Insider regulation; Agent-based model; Financial market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976916301831
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:68:y:2018:i:c:p:203-210

Access Statistics for this article

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance is currently edited by R. J. Arnould and J. E. Finnerty

More articles in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2018-06-02
Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:68:y:2018:i:c:p:203-210