Dual-class firms, M&As and SOX
Ashrafee T. Hossain and
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2019, vol. 71, issue C, 176-187
By analyzing a large sample of M&A deals undertaken by domestic dual-class acquirers in the United States (1996–2009), this study finds that deals were more value-enhancing for acquiring firm shareholders, both in the short- and long-term, in the aftermath of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This study provides evidence that the transparency measures mandated by SOX had positive and tangible incremental benefits evidenced by enhanced performance by supposedly ‘poorly governed’ dual-class acquirers relative to their single-class counterparts.
Keywords: Dual-class firms; Transparency; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; SOX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G30 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:71:y:2019:i:c:p:176-187
Access Statistics for this article
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance is currently edited by R. J. Arnould and J. E. Finnerty
More articles in The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().