Privatization and state ownership of natural advantage industries

Jean-Claude Cosset, Art Durnev and Igor Oliveira dos Santos

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2020, vol. 76, issue C, 68-83

Abstract: Using a hand-collected sample of state-owned enterprises and newly privatized firms around the globe, we investigate state ownership patterns in natural advantage (substantial oil reserves or mineral deposits) industries. We find that ultimate state ownership is higher when competition is lower and when economic activity is more geographically concentrated. We also observe that governments tend to privatize larger firms, confirming the selection bias concerns of earlier studies, but only where corruption is curbed. Finally, we confirm that ultimate state ownership results in a deterioration of firm performance and that share-issue privatizations improve firm performance more than asset sales.

Keywords: Privatization; Natural advantage; Rent-seeking; Agglomeration economies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G32 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:76:y:2020:i:c:p:68-83

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2019.08.005

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