Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime

Jerry L. Jordan and William Luther

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2022, vol. 84, issue C, 510-515

Abstract: The Federal Reserve is exposed to a greater degree of political influence under its new operating regime. We survey the relevant literature and describe the Fed's new operating regime. Then we explain how the regime change reduced de facto central bank independence. In brief, the regime change increased the appointment power of the President and improved the bargaining power of Congress. We offer some suggestions for bolstering de facto independence at the Fed.

Keywords: Central bank; Central bank independence; Federal Reserve; Monetary policy; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E52 E58 H11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:84:y:2022:i:c:p:510-515

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2020.10.006

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