 The association between financially expert independent directors and the accounting for employee stock optionsLing Jiang, Kenneth R. Ferris and Edward N. Coffman Research in Accounting Regulation, 2009, vol. 21, issue 1, 1-10 Abstract: This study investigates how the financial expertise of independent directors is associated with voluntary accounting policy decisions. As representatives of a company’s shareholders, financially-expert independent directors are more likely to cause management to pursue higher quality accounting policy decisions. The policy decision investigated involves the expense/non-expense policy choice for employee stock options as previously permitted under SFAS No. 123. Using a sample of 174 option-expensing firms and a matched control sample of 174 non-expensing firms, the results indicate a significant, positive association between the decision to expense employee stock options and the financial expertise of a company’s independent directors. Further, a significant, negative association was found between the option-expensing decision and whether the chief executive officer was the largest internal blockholder. Keywords: Boards of directors; Employee stock options; Voluntary accounting policy decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reacre:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:1-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.racreg.2008.11.001 Access Statistics for this article Research in Accounting Regulation is currently edited by G. Previts More articles in Research in Accounting Regulation from Elsevier |
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