Disclosure versus recognition: Evidence from lobbying behavior in response to SFAS No. 158

Abraham N. Fried

Research in Accounting Regulation, 2012, vol. 24, issue 1, 25-32

Abstract: This study examines the lobbying behavior of firms following the release of the SFAS No. 158 exposure draft. SFAS No. 158 requires the recognition of previously disclosed net pension and postretirement benefit obligations on the balance sheet. The study documents that firms that lobbied against the pronouncement had large, underfunded plans and the decision to lobby was related to the magnitude of the SFAS No. 158 balance sheet adjustment. The findings have important implications for the recognition versus disclosure debate because they document management’s reaction to the relocation of information disclosed in the financial statement footnotes to its recognition on the balance sheet.

Keywords: Pensions and postretirement plans; Disclosure; Recognition; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1052045711000622
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reacre:v:24:y:2012:i:1:p:25-32

DOI: 10.1016/j.racreg.2011.12.006

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Accounting Regulation is currently edited by G. Previts

More articles in Research in Accounting Regulation from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().