 Defending a single object against an attacker trying to detect a subset of false targetsR. Peng, Q.Q. Zhai and G. Levitin Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 137-147 Abstract: Deployment of false targets can be a very important and effective measure for enhancing the survivability of an object subjected to intentional attacks. Existing papers have assumed that false targets are either perfect or can be detected with a constant probability. In practice, the attacker may allocate part of its budget into intelligence actions trying to detect a subset of false targets. Analogously, the defender can allocate part of its budget into disinformation actions to prevent the false targets from being detected. In this paper, the detection probability of each false target is assumed to be a function of the intelligence and disinformation efforts allocated on the false target. The optimal resource distribution between target identification/disinformation and attack/protection efforts is studied as solutions of a non-cooperative two period min–max game between the two competitors for the case of constrained defense and attack resources. Keywords: Reliability; Vulnerability; Defense; Attack; False targets; Contest success function (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reensy:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:137-147 DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2016.01.002 Access Statistics for this article Reliability Engineering and System Safety is currently edited by Carlos Guedes Soares More articles in Reliability Engineering and System Safety from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.