 Optimal defense-attack strategies between M defenders and N attackers: A method based on cumulative prospect theoryChen Lin, Hui Xiao, Rui Peng and Yisha Xiang Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2021, vol. 210, issue C Abstract: This research studies the system defense of M defenders against N attackers. We model this problem as a defense-attack game between M defenders and N attackers based on the cumulative prospect theory. In this game, the defenders can allocate their resources to defend the system from being attacked, and to attack the attackers such that the opponents lose their offensive power. In response, the attackers can allocate its offensive resources to attack the system and defend themselves from being attacked by the defenders. In this research, we use the cumulative prospect value instead of the vulnerability as the performance measure such that the risk attitudes of defenders and attackers can be considered. Further, we study the cooperative behaviors and non-cooperative behaviors of the attackers and analyze the effect on the optimal resource allocation. Numerical experiments are carried out to illustrate the applications. Keywords: Defense and attack; Cumulative prospect theory; Risk attitude; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reensy:v:210:y:2021:i:c:s0951832021000727 DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2021.107510 Access Statistics for this article Reliability Engineering and System Safety is currently edited by Carlos Guedes Soares More articles in Reliability Engineering and System Safety from Elsevier |
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