A Review of Game Theory and Risk and Reliability Analysis in Infrastructures and Networks

Kjell Hausken, Jonathan W. Welburn and Jun Zhuang

Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2025, vol. 261, issue C

Abstract: Game theory and risk and reliability analysis are reviewed related to multiple targets, infrastructures and networks. Methodologies and terminology are described, including strategic choices, the use of probability theory, and equilibrium and minmax solutions. The review proceeds through defense and attack in reliability systems, and the related concept of system survivability which is the probability that a system continues functioning upon attack. A defender and an attacker allocate resources into preserving and operating versus disrupting or destroying targets (components). Thereafter multiple-target attacker-defender games are reviewed, at multiple levels, and followed by interdependence between targets. That is relevant since an attack on or disruption of one target may impact other targets, which impacts the defender's resource allocation across targets and the attacker's strategy. Interdiction strategies to preserve and disrupt, respectively, the operation of networks are analyzed. For example, society seeks to preserve infrastructure networks, and disrupt flows of illegal drugs and enemy troops. The review highlights how cascading failures influence strategic decision-making, requiring adaptive security mechanisms. Research on electric power grids and transportation networks is examined, demonstrating how attacker-defender interactions impact critical infrastructure resilience. By systematically classifying gametheoretic models, this review identifies key methodological advancements in attacker-defender equilibrium modeling, stochastic risk assessment, and resilience optimization. Future research directions are assessed, emphasizing the need for dynamic reliability modeling, multi-agent frameworks, and empirical validation to enhance real-world applicability. This review serves as a foundation for integrating game theory into risk and reliability analysis, providing actionable insights for researchers and practitioners in infrastructure security.

Keywords: Game theory; Risk analysis; Reliability; Infrastructure protection; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reensy:v:261:y:2025:i:c:s0951832025003242

DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2025.111123

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