Integrating cyber attacks within fault trees

Igor Nai Fovino, Marcelo Masera and Alessio De Cian

Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2009, vol. 94, issue 9, 1394-1402

Abstract: In this paper, a new method for quantitative security risk assessment of complex systems is presented, combining fault-tree analysis, traditionally used in reliability analysis, with the recently introduced Attack-tree analysis, proposed for the study of malicious attack patterns. The combined use of fault trees and attack trees helps the analyst to effectively face the security challenges posed by the introduction of modern ICT technologies in the control systems of critical infrastructures. The proposed approach allows considering the interaction of malicious deliberate acts with random failures. Formal definitions of fault tree and attack tree are provided and a mathematical model for the calculation of system fault probabilities is presented.

Keywords: Security; Risk assessment; Fault tree; Attack tree (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reensy:v:94:y:2009:i:9:p:1394-1402

DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2009.02.020

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