On incentives for assurance of petroleum supply

Petter Osmundsen, Terje Aven and Asgeir Tomasgard

Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2010, vol. 95, issue 2, 143-148

Abstract: Assurance of supply is a crucial objective for producers and consumers of oil and gas. A basic requirement to meet this objective is that producers and transmitters have sufficient economic incentives and capabilities to assure a desired degree of supply. The topic of this paper is to evaluate these incentives from a broad perspective. We examine economic trade-offs inherent in a delay of production, including reputational issues, as well as contract incentives for gas sellers, drilling companies, and oil service companies.

Keywords: Production assurance; Incentives; Economic trade-offs; Reputation; Oil and gas industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reensy:v:95:y:2010:i:2:p:143-148

DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2009.09.005

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