EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Modal choice and optimal congestion

Quentin David and Renaud Foucart

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2014, vol. 48, issue C, 12-20

Abstract: We study the choice of transportation modes within a city where commuters have heterogeneous preferences for a car. As in standard models of externalities, the market outcome never maximizes aggregate welfare. We show that in the presence of multiple equilibria problems of coordination can worsen this result. We discuss two policy tools: taxation and traffic separation (e.g. exclusive lanes for public transportation). Setting the optimal policy is a necessary but not sufficient condition to maximize aggregate welfare. Even with a social planner maximizing aggregate welfare, a city may find itself stuck in a situation where public transportation remains inefficient and the level of congestion high.

Keywords: Modal choice; Coordination; Network effect; Cross-modal congestion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 L5 R4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166046214000404
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Modal choice and optimal congestion (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:regeco:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:12-20

DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.04.005

Access Statistics for this article

Regional Science and Urban Economics is currently edited by D.P McMillen and Y. Zenou

More articles in Regional Science and Urban Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:48:y:2014:i:c:p:12-20