Comparison of Nash and evolutionary stable equilibrium in asymmetric tax competition

Robert Philipowski

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2015, vol. 51, issue C, 7-13

Abstract: We show that under suitable assumptions the evolutionary stable tax rate in asymmetric tax competition is strictly lower than all tax rates obtained in Nash equilibrium, generalizing in this way a recent result by Sano (Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 9 (2012), S1–S23) and Wagener (International Economic Review 54 (2013), 1251–1264) obtained in the context of symmetric tax competition. Our assumptions are satisfied in several models of capital and commodity tax competition.

Keywords: Asymmetric tax competition; Nash equilibrium; Evolutionary stable strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H73 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:regeco:v:51:y:2015:i:c:p:7-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.12.003

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