EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Grandfather-based or benchmark-based: Strategy choice for carbon quota allocation methods in the carbon neutrality era

Xuefeng Zhang, Zhe Li and Guo Li

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2024, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: Climate change and extreme weather caused by the greenhouse effect have attracted global attention. Governments and public sectors are beginning to recognize the importance of reducing carbon emissions and have reached a consensus on “carbon neutrality.” This study investigates the strategic choice of carbon quota allocation methods within a supply chain framework, involving a policy maker (government), a manufacturer, and a retailer. At the outset, the government selects either the grandfather-based allocation method (Method G) or the benchmark-based allocation method (Method B) to regulate the manufacturer's carbon emissions. Subsequently, the manufacturer determines the level of carbon emission reduction and wholesale pricing, and the retailer sets the order quantity based on the manufacturer's decision. Drawing on equilibrium outcomes, this research compares the optimal decisions of firms, carbon emissions, consumer surplus, overall social welfare, and supply chain sustainability under these two methods. The research highlights several major findings. First, regardless of which allocation method is adopted, a rise of the initial carbon emission in producing process will lead to an increase in the wholesale price, but a decrease in emission reduction level and the order quantity. Second, under method B, the manufacturer reduces more carbon emission. Third, from the social welfare perspective, the method B/G is a better choice for the government when the environmental damage coefficient is relatively low/high. Fourth, when carbon quota and the initial carbon emission meet some certain conditions, the method B can achieve environmental sustainability and economic sustainability.

Keywords: Carbon quota allocation method; Carbon neutrality; Supply chain; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364032123010535
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:rensus:v:192:y:2024:i:c:s1364032123010535

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600126/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... 600126/bibliographic

DOI: 10.1016/j.rser.2023.114195

Access Statistics for this article

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews is currently edited by L. Kazmerski

More articles in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:rensus:v:192:y:2024:i:c:s1364032123010535