An analysis of the climate change architecture

Matthew Kennedy and Biswajit Basu

Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2014, vol. 34, issue C, 185-193

Abstract: This paper examines the complexity of the current negotiations to avert climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Drawing on economic game theory modelling, it interprets the latest developments within the international negotiations and provides a political economy analysis of the climate change architecture. It places the pursuit of international co-operation, via the Kyoto Protocol׳s second commitment period, in the context of a country׳s maintenance of national interest and a flexible emissions abatement strategy.

Keywords: Game theory; Climate change negotiations; Agreement; UNFCCC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:rensus:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:185-193

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DOI: 10.1016/j.rser.2014.02.036

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