Spatial modeling of extraction and enforcement in developing country protected areas

Heidi Albers

Resource and Energy Economics, 2010, vol. 32, issue 2, 165-179

Abstract: Budget constraints prohibit protected area managers (PAMs) in developing countries from completely deterring extraction and the resulting resource degradation. Because benefits from extraction are a function of distance, PAMs have an opportunity to patrol in a spatial pattern that minimizes degradation for a given budget level. This paper develops a spatial model of a game between a PAM and neighboring villagers to determine the optimal patterns of extraction and enforcement under various constraints. It demonstrates the importance of spatial aspects of PA management, reveals the inefficiency of many PA policies, and supports explicitly spatial management schemes such as extraction zones. The framework underpins a discussion of incomplete enforcement, rural welfare, budgetary tradeoffs between PA size and enforcement costs, and PA shape decisions with human-induced edge effects.

Keywords: Enforcement; Buffer; zone; Parks; Biodiversity; Reserve; site; selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:32:y:2010:i:2:p:165-179

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