Environmental standards as strategic outcomes: A simple model

Rabindra N. Bhattacharya and Rupayan Pal

Resource and Energy Economics, 2010, vol. 32, issue 3, 408-420

Abstract: This paper analyses the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards considering both local and global pollution under alternative regimes of international trade. It also compares and contrasts the strategic equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. On the contrary, in case of closed economies, environmental standards are always strategic substitutes. It also shows that the strategic equilibrium environmental standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. Whereas, in absence of international trade, countries set, in equilibrium, lower environmental standards than the world optimum.

Keywords: Environmental; standards; Local; pollution; Global; pollution; Strategic; choice; World; optimum (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental Standards as Strategic Outcomes: A Simple Model (2008)
Working Paper: Environmental standards as strategic outcomes: A Simple model
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:32:y:2010:i:3:p:408-420

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