Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective

Chu-chuan Cheng and Yu-Bong Lai

Resource and Energy Economics, 2012, vol. 34, issue 4, 431-441

Abstract: The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters’ expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation, thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Compliance; Enforcement policy; Environmental policy; Interest groups; Lobbying; Political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H23 H26 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:34:y:2012:i:4:p:431-441

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.04.003

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