Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy

Bouwe Dijkstra and Dirk Rübbelke

Resource and Energy Economics, 2013, vol. 35, issue 1, 38-59

Abstract: We examine an incentive scheme for a group of agents, where all agents are rewarded if the group meets its target. If the group does not meet its target, only the agents that meet their individual target are rewarded. This incentive scheme is applied in the UK Climate Change Agreements. There is only a difference in outcome between group and individual rewards if performance is stochastic. Group rewards lead to lower abatement than individual rewards if targets are realistic, i.e. if they have a high probability of being reached. Given the strictness of the targets, the agents prefer group rewards. The principal might want to use group rewards because they require less information, out of fairness concerns, or to combine strict targets with weak enforcement.

Keywords: Team incentive scheme; Stochastic emissions; UK Climate Change Agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 J33 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy (2007)
Working Paper: Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy (2007)
Working Paper: Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:35:y:2013:i:1:p:38-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.09.001

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