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Instrument choice when regulators are concerned about resource extinction

Lars Hansen, Frank Jensen and Clifford Russell

Resource and Energy Economics, 2013, vol. 35, issue 2, 135-147

Abstract: In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximizing industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic or precautionary principles.

Keywords: Prices versus quantities; Resource extinction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Instrument Choice when Regulators are Concerned about Resource Extinction (2011) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:35:y:2013:i:2:p:135-147

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.12.001

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