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Strategic interaction and institutional quality determinants of environmental regulations

Gregmar Galinato () and Hayley Chouinard ()

Resource and Energy Economics, 2018, vol. 53, issue C, 114-132

Abstract: We provide a framework that links the impacts of own and neighboring measures of institutional quality as well as neighboring country environmental regulations on environmental regulation stringency in own country. We estimate a Spatial Panel Durbin model to identify significant determinants of environmental regulations for several European countries. We find no evidence of strategic interaction as the environmental regulations implemented by a neighbor have no significant impact on environmental regulations implemented in the own country. The higher the quality of government institutions in a country, the more stringent the implementation of environmental regulations. Additionally, some institutional quality variables significantly positively impact the stringency of environmental regulations in neighboring countries.

Keywords: Environmental regulations; Institutions spillovers; Spatial model; Strategic interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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