The effects of Clean Water Act enforcement on environmental employment

Zach Raff and Dietrich Earnhart

Resource and Energy Economics, 2019, vol. 57, issue C, 1-17

Abstract: This study explores the effects of environmental enforcement on the amount of environmental labor employed by facilities regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. The study uses panel data from a unique survey of chemical manufacturing facilities operating between 1999 and 2001. Specifically, the analysis examines the influence of monitoring inspections and enforcement actions, e.g., fines, on the number of employees allocated to environmental management. Empirical results show that environmental enforcement negatively affects the amount of environmental labor allocated by the sampled facilities. Specifically, increases in federal inspections, informal enforcement actions, and monetary fines each lower environmental employment. Extended model results provide evidence that these negative effects stem from the crowding out of facility managers’ intrinsic motivations.

Keywords: Environmental employment; Enforcement; Environmental regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 K32 Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:1-17

DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2018.12.002

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