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Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

Bouwe R. Dijkstra and Andries Nentjes

Resource and Energy Economics, 2020, vol. 61, issue C

Abstract: We compare two cooperation mechanisms for consumer/producers of a public good: the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) and the Exchange-Matching-Lindahl (EML) solution, where each agent specifies her demand for and supply of the public good according to her personal exchange rate. Both mechanisms are Pareto-efficient. EML is equivalent to matching. In our specific model with linear or quadratic benefits and quadratic costs, EML and NBS are equivalent when there are two agents. With more than two agents, the high-benefit/low-cost agents are better off under EML. We also analyze outsourcing, where agent i can pay agent j to produce the amount that agent i promised to contribute. In our specific model, payments from high-cost to low-cost agents (and from high-benefit to low-benefit agents) are (usually) lower in EML than in NBS.

Keywords: Nash bargaining solution; Exchange; matching; Lindahl mechanism; public goods; outsourcing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 Q58 Q59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2020.101179

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